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Abstract
Exclusive patents sacrifice product competition to provide firms incentives to innovate. We
characterize an alternative mechanism whereby later inventors are allowed to share the patent
if they discover within a certain time period of the first inventor. These runner-up patents
increase social welfare under very general conditions. Furthermore, we show that the time
window during which later inventors can share the patent should become a new policy tool
at the disposal of the designer. This instrument will be used in a socially optimal mix with
the breadth and length of the patent and could allow sorting between more or less efficient
firms.
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I. Introduction
In 1976 Eugene Goldwasser, after 20 years of work, successfully identified
and isolated the erythropoiesis protein (EPO), whose function is to produce
red blood cells in the body. His work attracted the attention of three com-
panies, Biogen, Amgen, and the Genetics Institute, which started research
programs to isolate the human gene responsible for the production of EPO.
In 1983, Amgen succeeded and filed for a patent at the US Patent Office.
Less than a year later, the Genetics Institute published similar results in the
journal Nature but realized its success was economically pointless because
a patent had already been submitted. The drug Epogen, subsequently sold
by Amgen, became one of the most successful in history, generating rev-
enues of two billion dollars per year, an annual treatment costing, 5,000
dollars per patient. Amgen appears to be fully exercising its monopoly
power at the expense of patients and government medical assistance
programs.1
∗I wish to thank particularly Douglas Bernheim for his generous support and advice. This
research was supported by the Leonard W. Ely and Shirley R. Ely Graduate Student Fund
through a grant to the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
1 The cost of production represents approximately 5% of the revenues, and the initial invest-
ment in research did not exceed 170 million dollars.
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Recent empirical evidence (Cohen and Ishii, 2005) suggests that quasi-
simultaneous invention, as in the case of Epogen, is not a rare event. Cohen
and Ishii (2005) use patent interference cases in the US to overcome the
empirical challenge that the second inventor is typically not observed. A
patent examiner has to declare an interference if two inventors file for
the same invention within a short time period (three months for lesser in-
ventions and six months for more important ones).2 They show that from
1988 to 1994, 0.6% of granted patents were declared in interference, and
2.14% were for drugs and 4.97% for biotech. We believe that the percent-
age of quasi-simultaneous inventions is likely to exceed these numbers for
two reasons. First, these are percentages of the total number of patents
awarded, and only a fraction of these will prove valuable.3 Moreover, it is
likely that quasi-simultaneous invention occurs mostly for valuable ideas.
Second, the window to declare an interference is short (maximum of six
months).
In this paper, we build on this empirical evidence to address the following
question. Would it be socially beneficial to let later inventors, such as the
Genetics Institute, share the patent if they discover soon enough after the
first inventor? The current patent system grants socially costly exclusive
rights to first inventors to encourage risky investments in research. We want
to determine if an efficient trade-off between incentives to innovate and
deadweight loss on the product market can be achieved without necessarily
awarding monopolies. We therefore study an alternative mechanism, which
we call runner-up patents, whereby if a first inventor files for a patent at
time t, any other inventor who discovers before time t + T is allowed to
share the patent and compete on the product market.
We study this alternative mechanism in a theoretical model where firms
first race for an innovation and then potentially compete in the product mar-
ket. We show that under very general conditions, runner-up patents increase
social welfare. We can separate their overall impact into two channels:
they affect both incentives to innovate and deadweight loss on the product
market. In most cases, runner-up patents decrease incentives to innovate.
However, the second effect is always positive, because this mechanism in-
duces socially beneficial competition in the product market. We show that
under a very general condition, this second effect more than compensates
the first.
We consider the time window T (time period starting after the first inven-
tor succeeds and during which later inventors are still allowed to patent),
2 The patent office then investigates the case more thoroughly to determine the identity of
the first inventor.
3 The distribution of patent values is known to be heavily skewed (see Harhoff, Narin, Scherer,
and Vopel, 1999).
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which we name patenting window, as a new tool at the disposal of the
policy-maker. In the results previously mentioned, the existing patent pol-
icy tools, such as the length and breadth of the patent, were supposed fixed.
In the second part of the paper, we ask a different question. Is the patent-
ing window a redundant tool or can it achieve a more efficient trade-off
between incentives to innovate and deadweight loss than the existing instru-
ments? We therefore examine the optimal mix with the length and breadth
of the patent. We show that under very general conditions the patenting
window is more efficient than these existing tools.
Finally, we demonstrate that the patenting window could become a very
useful sorting tool. We show that the designer could sort between more or
less efficient firms by offering a menu of patents where the inventor could
trade off a longer patenting window against a longer length. An efficient
firm would be willing to take the risk of allowing other firms to patent
during a certain time period in exchange for a longer protection. A well-
designed menu could therefore increase the incentives to innovate for the
more efficient firm.
Runner-up patents could probably be implemented relatively easily in
practice. One concern could be that following disclosure by the first inven-
tor, the follower could easily copy the invention. However, under current
patent law, the details of the invention are only publicly disclosed 18 months
after the filing date of the patent application. So introducing a patenting
window of 18 months would only require minor changes to the current
patent system. Such a minor reform could already have important conse-
quences. In the case of Epogen, we calculate that runner-up patents with an
18-month patenting window could have increased the discounted expected
social welfare at the start of the race between Amgen and the Genetics
Institute by close to one billion dollars.4
In Section II we derive a general condition guaranteeing that runner-
up patents increase social welfare. In Section III we examine the optimal
mix of instruments. In Section IV we consider the patenting window as a
sorting tool. Several articles—La Manna, Macleod, and de Meza (1989),
Maurer and Scotchmer (2002), and Shapiro (2006)—build on similar con-
cerns about the current patent system and argue for a more permissive
environment. We discuss the links with these papers in Section V. We also
discuss the connections between the patenting window and the classical
notion of breadth. All proofs are presented in the Appendix.
4 We obtain this figure by tailoring our model to that application. We fix the expected speed
of the Poisson research at seven years (this was the length of the research performed by the
two successful firms). We also assume linear demand on the product market and Cournot
competition. We use the observed monopoly profits obtained by Amgen (in the order of
US$1.9 billion) to adjust profits and surplus. Finally we assume an interest rate of 3%.
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II. Runner-up Patents and Social Welfare
The Model
We consider a model where two risk-neutral symmetric firms race to ob-
tain an innovation.5 At date 0 they determine their investments in research
(x1, x2). The investment xi is sunk initially and determines the speed of the
research process. Specifically, the distribution of discovery time for firm i
is a Poisson process of parameter h(xi ).6
Two main instruments characterize the patent system: the length of the
patent L and the patenting window T (with L ≥ T ). If the first firm to
succeed obtains the invention at date t, the second firm can still patent
and share the market if it invents before date t + T . In this case the two
firms share the market. If the second firm is unable to succeed within this
window, the first obtains exclusive rights until expiration of the patent. At
t + L the patent expires and the market is then characterized by free entry.
We note that for T = 0 this model is a classical description of the current
regulatory system.
Firms maximize their expected profits. If the first inventor obtains the
exclusive patent, she collects a flow of monopoly profits πm until the patent
expires at t + L . If the firms share the patent, they both obtain a flow of
duopoly profits πd . Total social welfare under monopoly is denoted Sm and
Sd under duopoly.
Finally, we make a number of assumptions on the shape of the discovery
process that guarantee the existence of an equilibrium where both firms
invest in research under the current patent system where T = 0. If the
research process is such that this equilibrium does not exist, at most one
firm conducts research, and runner-up patents are irrelevant. We therefore
exclude these cases from our analysis by making the following assumptions
on the function h that characterizes the research process:
5 It is important to point out that if the firms were sufficiently risk averse, runner-up patents
would always increase incentives to innovate. Indeed, one of the main effects of this system
is to provide positive profits in a wider range of cases; profits can now be obtained by a firm
that is not the first to invent. Therefore, for a sufficient degree of risk aversion, runner-up
patents would always appear more attractive than the standard patents. To abstract from the
impact of risk aversion and concentrate on other effects, we suppose that inventors are risk
neutral.
6 Note that we assume that the second inventor does not adapt his research effort after
observing the success of the first; that is, both x1 and x2 are determined initially. This is
sensible for two reasons. First, the second inventor might not observe success of the first. For
instance in the current patent system, when an application is being reviewed, it is not made
public. Second, most of our results are established for small patenting windows, leaving little
time for the second inventor to change his research strategy.
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Assumption 1. h(0) = 0.
Assumption 2. h′(0) = +∞.
Assumption 3. h is increasing, twice continuously differentiable, and con-
cave.
Runner-up Patents and Social Welfare
As pointed out in the Introduction, runner-up patents have two effects: an
ex ante effect on incentives to innovate and an ex post effect on social
surplus. This section examines the direction of these effects and the overall
impact on social welfare in the case of an infinite patent length (L = +∞).
The expected profits of the innovators, at the start of the race, are given
by the expression:
h(x1)VW + h(x2)VL
h(x1) + h(x2) + r − x1,
where
VW =
∫ T
0
[
πm
r
[1 − e−r t2 ] + πd
r
[e−r t2 ]
]
h(x2)e
−h(x2)t2 dt2
+ πm
r
∫ + ∞
T
h(x2)e
−h(x2)t2 dt2
is the expected pay-off to firm 1 if it wins the race, and
VL =
∫ T
0
πd
r
[e−r t ]h(x1)e−h(x1)t dt
is the expected profit of firm 1 if it loses the race.
Innovators choose their investments in research to maximize their ex-
pected profits at the start of the race. The first-order conditions can be
expressed as
[h(x1) + h(x2) + r ]2 = h′(x1)[(h(x2) + r )VW − h(x2)VL ]
+ h(x2)V ′L (x1)(h(x1) + h(x2) + r ).
Since firms are symmetric, we concentrate on the symmetric equilibrium
where x1 = x2 = x∗. Furthermore, we concentrate on limit results for small
patenting windows; that is, the case where T = 0. The symmetric equilib-
rium for T = 0 is characterized by
h′(x∗)(h(x∗) + r )
(2h(x∗) + r )2
πm
r
= 1.
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In the following proposition, we use the first-order conditions to establish
that the first effect of runner-up patents on incentives to innovate is negative
under a general condition on profits. Runner-up patents therefore tend to
decrease incentives to innovate.
Proposition 1. If πm ≥ 2πd , runner-up patents decrease the equilibrium
investment in research: (dx∗/dT ) (0) < 0.
If monopoly profits are larger than aggregate profits under duopoly,
runner-up patents decrease incentives to innovate. The intuition for this
result is more transparent in the context of a simple one-period game
where each firm succeeds with a fixed probability p. Under the cur-
rent patent system, the expected profits of a firm engaged in the race is
πcurrent = p(1 − p)πm + p2 12πm (if they both succeed, one will be randomly
chosen to obtain the exclusive patent). With runner-up patents in place, the
profits become πrunner-up = p(1 − p)πm + p2πd . The relevant comparison is
indeed between 2πd and πm . With a certain probability, both firms simul-
taneously discover. With runner-up patents, rather than obtaining monopoly
profits with a probability of one-half, firms have to compete for the market
and collect profits πd .7
Many markets satisfy the condition of Proposition 1. However, we can
also easily find examples where this condition is violated. This can be
the case if for instance the invention can have different applications and
if licensing contracts are hard to negotiate.8 It could also be the case if
the two firms invent differentiated products. In general, if the condition
is violated, runner-up patents will assuredly be socially beneficial. They
both increase research incentives and decrease the deadweight loss on the
market.
Proposition 1 indicates that runner-up patents generally decrease incen-
tives to innovate. However, there exists a countervailing effect. Runner-
up patents increase competition on the product market and therefore
decrease deadweight loss after the invention has been obtained. The
7 A similar point was made in Maurer and Scotchmer (2002) in Proposition 2, where they
point out that independent-invention defense would tend to decrease research incentives and
thus duplicative research.
8 For instance, marketing a product for specific groups of customers can increase aggregate
profits, and this might be better achieved by two different firms. This of course raises the
issue of why the first inventor would not license to a second firm. The case of Epogen again
provides a good example. Amgen licensed its drug to Johnson & Johnson in 1985 to try
and efficiently split the market; Epogen targeted the kidney disease patients, whereas Procrit
sold by Johnson & Johnson marketed it for cancer-related anemia. However, Amgen claims
that the licensing agreement was abused and Procrit was invading its market. This episode
suggests why certain companies might avoid licensing contracts and why, therefore, having
two competitors might increase aggregate profits.
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following proposition examines the overall effect on social welfare. We
obtain conditions such that the expected social welfare is increasing in T
at T = 0.
Proposition 2. Runner-up patents are socially beneficial under the follow-
ing condition:
−[Sm −πm][πm − 2πd ] +πm[Sd − Sm] > 0.
In particular this will be the case if
(a) social surplus under competition is high enough: Sd > 2Sm ;
(b) private and social benefits under monopoly are comparable
Sm[r/h(x∗) + r ] <πm ;
(c) demand is linear, both for Cournot and Bertrand competition.
According to result (a), if the surplus under competition is high enough
compared to that under monopoly, runner-up patents are socially beneficial
regardless of the nature of demand, competition, or the research process.
The intuition for this result is that if surplus is much higher under duopoly,
the gains from increased competition (second term in the characteristic
equation) more than compensate the loss of incentives (first term), even in
the worst-case scenario of zero profits under duopoly. Result (c), on the
other hand, studies the case of a particular functional form: if demand is
linear, departing from the current winner-take-all system is always benefi-
cial, irrespective of the type of competition.
Result (b) states that if private and social benefits under monopoly are
not too different, runner-up patents always increase social welfare. In the
presentation of the results, we have chosen to separate the impact of these
patents into two effects (ex ante incentives and ex post deadweight loss)
and to present an increase in research incentives as always being socially
desirable. This simplification in the exposition was aimed at providing a
clear presentation of the different channels, although all the results were
obtained directly by maximizing the expected social welfare. Case (b)
illustrates the fact that decreasing incentives can actually be beneficial if the
research conducted under the current system was already excessive. If, for
example, private and social benefits under monopoly are equal (Sm =πm),
a unique firm chooses the socially optimal amount of research.9 If a com-
petitor enters the race, research in excess of this optimum will therefore
be conducted. Runner-up patents are then beneficial on two accounts: they
decrease incentives to innovate, and they decrease deadweight loss.
9 Loury (1979) makes this assumption that social and private benefits are equal (Sm =πm )
and logically finds in Section IV of his paper, where he studies the welfare analysis of patent
races, that firms conduct a socially excessive amount of research.
C© The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2010.
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III. Optimal Mix of Patent Policy Tools
In the previous section we assumed that the existing patent policy tools
(length and breadth) were fixed10 and showed that introducing a new in-
strument, the patenting window, was socially beneficial. However, all these
tools can trade off incentives to innovate against deadweight loss in the
product market in very different ways.11 Therefore we cannot yet rule out
that runner-up patents appear socially beneficial only because the other
existing tools are not optimally set.
To fully evaluate the benefits from runner-up patents, we therefore need
to address a broader question: is the patenting window a redundant tool
or can it achieve a more efficient trade-off between these two effects? To
answer this question, we study the optimal mix of these instruments. In
particular we determine conditions under which a socially optimal mix will
include a strictly positive patenting window.
General method
We first describe the general method to determine the socially optimal
mix between the patenting window T and the existing tools: length L and
breadth α. This method will use the results of the previous section. A
socially optimal mix of these instruments will induce a specific amount of
research at the lowest cost in terms of social welfare. We therefore need to
solve the problem of maximizing expected social surplus S(T , L,α), given
that the equilibrium amount of research x∗(T , L,α) is greater than a certain
value x .
The method follows these steps:
(1) Determine the Nash equilibrium of the research phase x∗(T , L,α).
(2) Determine the expected social surplus S(T , L,α), given the equilibrium
amount x∗.
(3) Solve for (T ∗, L∗,α∗) solution to:
max
T ,L,α
S(T , L,α) subject to T ≥ 0 and T ≤ L and x∗ ≥ x .
(4) Use the Kuhn–Tucker conditions to obtain a condition guaranteeing that
T ∗ > 0.
10 In particular the length was fixed at L = +∞.
11 For instance, decreasing the length of the patent decreases research incentives, as competi-
tors are allowed to enter earlier, but also decreases deadweight loss on the market.
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Optimal Mix of Instruments
We apply the method previously described to determine whether the patent-
ing window will be used in an optimal mix with the length and breadth of
the patent. Whereas the length is a straightforward concept (the law speci-
fies a patent’s expiration date), the breadth of a patent does not have a clear
legal specification. In general terms, it describes how various innovations
need to be in order to avoid infringing on their respective patents. From
this intuitive definition, we understand that a lot of discretion is left to
the patent office and the courts in making this decision. This concept of
breadth has therefore been modeled in a variety of ways in the literature.
We will discuss this point more systematically in Section V.
One general model by Denicolo (1996), more specifically adapted to the
study of patent races, covers most of the different definitions of breadth.
Following Denicolo’s approach, we suppose that as soon as the first inventor
succeeds, the competitor obtains profits πL (α) where 1 −α measures the
breadth of patents. The idea is that during the research process, the loser ac-
cumulates knowledge that will allow him to compete more efficiently with
the patented product (for example, it makes designing a non-infringing ver-
sion of the product less costly to develop), and a larger breadth makes this
competition more difficult. In the presence of runner-up patents, however,
the second competitor might continue searching until t + T . We also sup-
pose that both profits and social surplus depend on the abstract parameter
α;πm(α) is decreasing in α, and πL (α) and Sm(α) are increasing. In the fol-
lowing proposition, we derive under which conditions the patenting window
will be used in a socially optimal mix of instruments.
Proposition 3. The socially optimal mix (T ∗, L∗,α∗) will require the
patenting window T ∗ to be strictly positive if the following conditions are
satisfied:
Sd − Sm
πm +πL − 2πd >
S0 − Sm
πm +πL , (1)
Sd − Sm
πm +πL − 2πd > −
S′m(α)
π ′m(α) −π ′L (α)
. (2)
Both conditions compare ratios of social benefits over loss of incentives
from the different tools.12 Condition (1) guarantees that the patenting win-
dow is more efficient than the length, whereas condition (2) compares it
to the breadth. To be more specific, condition (1) compares the ratio of
12 These are similar to the ratio test presented in Scotchmer (2004, Ch. 4). It is obtained here
in a context with three instruments and patent races.
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social benefits over loss of incentives from the patenting window on the
left-hand side and the length on the right.13 Corollaries 1 to 3 provide in-
terpretations of these results. We start by analyzing the optimal mix with
the length.
Corollary 1.
(a) Condition (1) is satisfied for Cournot competition and linear demand.
(b) For Bertrand competition, the marginal effects of both tools are equal.
Moreover, at the limit, for small departures from Bertrand competition,
the condition is strictly satisfied.
Condition (1) depends exclusively on the nature of demand in the prod-
uct market and the type of competition. In particular, result (a) states that
for linear demand and Cournot competition, the patenting window is more
efficient than the length. Result (b), on the other hand, holds independent
of the type of demand. It underlines an essential difference between the
length and the patenting window. At first glance, both tools seem very
similar. Indeed, for Bertrand competition, they both replace monopoly by
perfect competition, and their marginal effects are therefore identical. How-
ever, the corollary also points out that for small deviations from Bertrand
competition, such as small rigidities in prices, the condition is strictly sat-
isfied.
The intuition for this result is that, for small departures from Bertrand
competition, increasing the patenting window has a smaller marginal effect
on social surplus than decreasing the length, but it also creates a smaller
reduction in incentives because the second inventor can obtain duopoly
profits. However, social surplus is maximal at Bertrand prices. The effect on
social surplus is therefore of second order whereas the change in incentives
is of first order. The patenting window therefore achieves, at the margin,
a more efficient trade-off between ex ante incentives and ex post surplus
than the length.
This result also reflects an essential difference between these tools. They
both encourage competition, but the origin of this competition proves to be
the key difference. If the length is reduced, competition comes from out-
side imitators (for example, for pharmaceutical companies, firms producing
generics), whereas if the patenting window is increased, only innovators in-
side the race will compete. Therefore, to achieve the same gain in social
13 With the patenting window, a marginal increase of T causes monopoly to be replaced by
duopoly at the margin. The social gain is therefore proportional to Sd − Sm , whereas the
expected profit is reduced from monopoly profits with probability 0.5 to duopoly profits.
The loss in terms of incentives is therefore proportional to 0.5(πm +πL ) −πd . A marginal
reduction in the length L leads to a social gain of S0 − Sm for a loss of incentives of πm +πL .
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surplus, it is less costly in terms of incentives to use the patenting window
as innovators inside the race can get partial compensation.14 The origin of
competition is the essential difference between these tools.
As previously stated, condition (2) reflects a similar comparison between
the patenting window and the breadth. It is, however, more difficult to inter-
pret because the concept of breadth is represented by an abstract parameter.
We therefore propose two examples to illustrate the result, following exam-
ples in Denicolo (1996).
The first example is a case of horizontal differentiation a` la Hotelling,
where consumers are distributed on the line (0, 1) and incur a transport cost
t. We suppose the two firms propose differentiated products and are located
at 0 and 1. They initially produce two goods of quality θ at zero cost.
They are engaged in a patent race to obtain an innovation that raises
the quality to θ + θ̂. As soon as one invents, the other can produce a
good of quality θ + α̂θ. However, in our set-up, the second firm can also
continue its research effort until the expiration of the patenting window.
We assume that a consumer that buys one unit of good i obtains utility
U = θi − tdi − pi , where pi is the price and di the distance to the product.
Given these assumptions, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 2. In the case of horizontal differentiation, condition (2) is al-
ways satisfied.
The second example is a case of process innovation in a Cournot duopoly.
The demand function is given by p = a − Q. Before the innovation, both
firms produce at constant marginal cost c = a and make zero profits. The
innovation reduces the marginal cost to c − d . As in the previous exam-
ple, the loser in the race may still appropriate some of the rents. More
specifically, we suppose the loser can produce at marginal cost c −αd.
Corollary 3. In this specific case of a process innovation in a Cournot
duopoly, condition (2) is always satisfied.
IV. Patenting Window as a Sorting Tool
This section illustrates another potential use of the patenting window: it
could become an efficient sorting tool. Specifically, we suppose that, at
the invention date, the first firm to succeed is offered the choice between
different menus (T , L) such that it can trade off a higher patenting window
T against a longer length L of protection. For example, the patent office
could offer the first inventor the choice between the menus (T = 0 months,
14 They obtain a compensation if they are second in the race, reflected in the smaller cost in
terms of incentives πm +πL − 2πd rather than πm +πL .
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L = 18 years) and (T = 18 months, L = 22 years). We illustrate in this
section potential benefits from such menus.
The breadth and renewal fees have been proposed as sorting instru-
ments in the literature. Cornelli and Schankerman (1999) and Scotch-
mer (1999) showed that efficient sorting could be achieved with a menu
of patent lives and associated renewal fees. More recently, Hopenhayn
and Mitchell (2001) provided a set of conditions under which a menu
of breadth and length is a more efficient sorting tool than renewal fees
are. We follow the lines of this literature, but we want to point out that
menus using the patenting window are easier to implement than menus with
breadth.15
An important concern expressed in the literature on patent races is that
the current uniform patent system provides the same research incentives
to all firms, regardless of their efficiency. The incentives are therefore
excessive for the less efficient firms and insufficient for the more efficient
ones. Currently, it is not possible to sort between these types. We suggest
in this section that using menus (T , L) can help achieve that goal. In the
case where the different types are determined by the speed of their research
process λ, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 4. The decision-maker can use menus (T , L) to provide higher
types with higher expected profits at the start of the race.
The intuition of this result is the following. If a highly efficient type
is the first to succeed, she does not place a high probability on the event
that a less efficient competitor will succeed soon afterwards. Therefore the
marginal value of a smaller patenting window is smaller for her, and she
is ready to face more risk in exchange for a longer protection. She can
therefore obtain a positive rent in the contract-signing phase.
V. Discussion and Links with the Literature
A number of contributions (La Manna et al., 1989; Maurer and Scotchmer,
2002; Shapiro, 2006) argue for a more permissive patent system. In this
section, we discuss those contributions in detail and also examine more
closely the links between the concept of breadth and our notion of patenting
window. We note that there is also a related body of literature on the
allocation of prizes in contests (Moldavanu and Sela, 2001; Szymanski and
Valetti, 2005). However, in this body of literature, the goal is to design
a contest that maximizes effort. The ex post effect on social surplus that
concerns us is not relevant in their framework.
15 The concept of breadth is already hard to define precisely, so it is probably impossible to
contract on.
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In an important paper, La Manna et al. (1989) examine the following
set-up: during the entire life of the patent, other inventors are allowed
to patent as well. They identify conditions under which this permissive
system is socially preferable to a stricter one. They do not consider strategic
investment in research but rather allow for free entry in the innovation
market. In our case, we limit the model to two inventors given that we
enrich it along other dimensions.16
Maurer and Scotchmer (2002) examine the impact on licensing incen-
tives of allowing independent inventors to patent. They show that in such
circumstances the first inventor would license her technology in order to
discourage investments in imitation. They conclude that, under the condi-
tion that the research costs of an imitator are more than half as high as
those of the initial inventor, the first inventor is able to fully deter entry
by competitors by granting a sufficient number of licenses. The focus of
their work is complementary to ours. They examine incentives of imitators
once an innovation has been adopted. We, on the other hand, study how
modifying the regulatory environment will affect firms racing to obtain the
innovation.
The most related contribution is a paper independently and simultane-
ously written by Shapiro (2006), which is a fitting example of simultaneous
invention. In a reduced-form timeless model, the paper examines the intro-
duction of prior-user rights. Given that timing is not explicitly considered,
prior-user rights are equivalent to independent-invention defense. The main
result of the paper, Theorem 1, identifies a condition that guarantees that the
introduction of independent-invention defense is socially optimal. The con-
dition they identify proves to be similar to condition (2) in Proposition 3.17
Our analysis therefore confirms the result of Theorem 1 in a model where
the timing of the innovation is made explicit.
These different papers argue in favor of a more permissive patent sys-
tem. Such considerations are also emerging in the law literature; see, for
instance, Lemley (2007). We point out, however, that a recent contribution
by Denicolo and Franzoni (2010) challenges this view, in particular in the
case where research costs are incurred as a flow. Introducing runner-up
patents would represent a major regulatory reform, and it is therefore im-
portant to consider the results’ robustness to different assumptions. It is
also essential to understand the details of the implementation. One of the
benefits of introducing a model where timing is explicit is that we can be
more precise about the benefits of such a reform. We argue in our paper in
16 Introducing a larger number of inventors would require keeping track of all invention dates,
and calculations would quickly become intractable.
17 In the proof of Theorem 1, Shapiro calculates the social benefits of introducing prior-user
rights (or independent-invention defense) given a length of patents that is optimally set.
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favor of the introduction of a new instrument of patent policy: the patent-
ing window. We unveil conditions under which it is more efficient than the
existing instruments. We also show that it can become an efficient sorting
tool.
Patenting Window and Breadth
The analysis in the previous sections has highlighted the fact that the patent-
ing window has similarities with the notion of breadth. This section ex-
amines these links more thoroughly. We start by looking at the various
definitions of breadth that can be found in the literature.
The breadth of the patent, as opposed to the length, is not a legally well-
defined concept. It measures in general how different an invention needs
to be to warrant a patent. Various representations of breadth have been
proposed. In the case of a process innovation (invention that is aimed at
developing a technology to reduce the cost of production), Nordhaus (1972)
defines breadth as the fraction of cost reduction that does not become freely
available to competing firms. Gallini (1992) develops a related concept and
models a wider patent as increasing the cost of imitation for competing
firms. Klemperer (1990) does not consider costs but directly studies a case
with differentiated products. He defines the breadth of the patent as the
distance in the characteristic space between the patented innovation and the
non-infringing products of the competitors.
In Section III we compared how efficient the patenting window is com-
pared to the breadth of the patent in balancing ex ante research incentives
and ex post deadweight loss. We compared it explicitly to specific notions
of breadth in Corollaries 2 and 3. Some of the results nevertheless suggest
that our notion of the patenting window is formally equivalent to a notion
of breadth. This is not the case. Denicolo (1996) proposes a unifying frame-
work for these different notions of breadth and summarizes the concept in
a single parameter α that parametrizes both the winner’s and the loser’s
profit in the innovation race. The patenting window does not, however, fit
this definition given its time dependency. The way this new instrument in-
fluences the profits of winners and losers depends on the respective dates
of invention.
The best conceptual representation of the patenting window is in fact a
time-varying breadth. Following discovery by the first inventor, the patent
is narrow (i.e., inventions with very similar claims are patentable) until
the expiration of the patenting window, when it becomes wider. It is in
fact conceivable that such a notion is already implicitly applied by patent
examiners and courts. It would be an interesting empirical exercise to test
whether, in patent infringement suits, a patent is more likely to be found
not to infringe if its invention date is close to that of the initial patent.
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VI. Conclusion
We have shown in this article that runner-up patents increase social welfare
in a wide variety of cases. We also showed that the patenting window could
become an essential tool of patent policy. We provide conditions under
which it can trade off incentives to innovate against deadweight loss more
efficiently than the existing instruments, such as the length and breadth of
the patent. We also suggest that it could become an essential sorting tool
that could allow, for instance, an increase in the research incentives of more
efficient firms.
This work could be extended in a number of ways. An interesting di-
rection would be to understand how runner-up patents might influence the
patenting of intermediate products. On the one hand, the incentives to patent
intermediate inventions are decreased because firms do not necessarily lose
everything if the competitor patents before them. On the other hand, runner-
up patents will decrease the cost of disclosing the discovery18 and might
therefore increase the incentives to disclose intermediate results. A differ-
ent model, allowing for cumulative inventions, will have to be proposed to
determine which of these two effects will dominate.
We also believe that we can further explore the idea of the patenting win-
dow as a sorting tool. We have focused on menus that trade off the patenting
window against length. It could also be interesting to study menus that trade
off the patenting window against the breadth of the patent. Moser (2005)
shows that in sectors where secrecy is a good defense, patents will not be an
attractive alternative. This secrecy is socially costly since knowledge is not
shared. It will therefore be important to design ways of bringing these firms
back to the patent system. A firm for which secrecy is a good alternative
might find the current uniform breadth not large enough to compensate for
the disclosure of its invention. However, such a firm could be willing to
trade off a higher patenting window (similar to taking the risk of secrecy)
against a larger breadth. Such a menu could be attractive enough to make
the patent system a serious alternative.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The symmetric equilibrium x∗ described in the main text is the solution to the
following:
18 Even if the competitor obtains useful information from the disclosure and is quicker to
develop an improvement, runner-up patents might still allow them to share the patent.
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πm(h(x) + r ) + πd T
[
(h(x))2
2h(x) + r
h(x) + r
]
e−(r+h(x))T
+πd
(
1 − e−(r+h(x))T ) [r h(x)(2h(x) + r )
(h(x) + r )2 −
h(x)2
h(x) + r
]
+ (πd −πm)(1 − e−(r+h(x))T )h(x)
= r (2h(x) + r )
2
h′(x)
.
This equation for T = 0 yields the result expressed in the main text.
Furthermore, we show that the second-order conditions are also verified at T = 0,
given that h is concave:
πm
r
h′′(x)(2h(x) + r ) − 2h′(x)2
(2h(x) + r )3 < 0.
To determine how the amount of research performed varies with the patenting window
T , we take the total derivative of the first-order conditions previously obtained.
0 = dx
[
πmh
′(x) − r 4h
′2(2h(x) + r ) − h′′(x)(2h(x) + r )2
h′(x)2
]
+ dT
[
πd h(x)
2 2h(x) + r
h(x) + r +πd
[
r
h(x)(2h(x) + r )
(h(x) + r ) − h(x)
2
]
+ (πd −πm)(r + h(x))h(x)
]
.
Simplifying this expression, we obtain
dx
dT
= (πm − 2πd )(r + h(x))h(x)
πmh′(x) − r 4h
′(x)2(2h(x) + r ) − h′′(x)(2h(x) + r )2
h′(x)2
.
To determine the sign of this expression, we use the first-order conditions characterizing
the equilibrium x∗:
h′(x∗)(h(x∗) + r )
(2h(x∗) + r )2
πm
r
= 1.
So, we can express the denominator as
r
(2h(x) + r )2
h(x) + r − r4(2h(x) + r ) + r
h′′(x)
h′(x)2
(2h(x) + r )2 < 0.
Therefore, if πm > 2πd , we find that (dx∗/dT )(0) < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2
We first prove the following lemma that provides sufficient conditions guaranteeing
that runner-up patents are socially beneficial.
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Lemma 1. Runner-up patents are socially beneficial if
−[Sm −πm][πm − 2πd ] +πm[Sd − Sm] > 0. (A1)
Proof : We first calculate the expected social welfare function at the start of the race,
given that both competitors in the symmetric equilibrium invest x∗. The instantaneous
social benefit if the two firms do not innovate within T of each other is the social
surplus from monopoly Sm . If they invent within T of each other, Sm until the loser
succeeds and Sd from then on. We have
W (T ) = 2Sm
r
∫ + ∞
0
e−r t h(x∗)e−h(x
∗)t
∫ + ∞
t + T
h(x∗)e−h(x
∗)t2 dt2dt
+ 2
∫ + ∞
0
h(x∗)e−h(x
∗)t
∫ t + T
t
[
Sm
r
[e−r t − e−r t2 ] + Sd
r
[e−r t2 ]
]
× h(x∗)e−h(x∗)t2 dt2dt − 2x∗.
Simplifying and factoring, we find
W (T ) = Sm
r
2h(x∗)
2h(x∗) + r +
[
1 − e−(h(x∗) + r )T ] [ Sd − Sm
r
]
×
[
2h(x∗)2
(h(x∗) + r )(2h(x∗) + r )
]
− 2x∗.
Taking the derivative at T = 0, we find the following first-order conditions:
dx∗
dT
(0)
[
Sm
πm
r
h(x∗) + r − 1
]
+ Sd − Sm
r
h2(x∗)
2h(x∗) + r > 0. (A2)
As (dx∗/dT )(0) < 0, a sufficient condition is
dx∗
dT
(0)
[
Sm
πm
− 1
]
+ Sd − Sm
r
h2(x∗)
2h(x∗) + r > 0.
Furthermore, we can rewrite dx/dT as
dx
dT
= (πm − 2πd )(r + h(x))h(x)
r
(2h(x) + r )( − 2h(x) − 3r )
(h(x) + r ) + r
h′′(x)
h′(x)2
(2h(x) + r )2
,
and because h′′ < 0, we have∣∣∣∣ dxdT
∣∣∣∣ < (πm − 2πd )(r + h(x))h(x)
r
(2h(x) + r )(2h(x) + 3r )
(h(x) + r )
.
Therefore a sufficient condition is
−
[
Sm
πm
− 1
]
(πm − 2πd ) (h(x
∗) + r )2
h(x∗)(2h(x∗) + 3r ) + Sd − Sm > 0.
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Furthermore, if r < 1,
(h(x∗) + r )2
h(x∗)(2h(x∗) + 3r ) < 1,
and we therefore obtain the second sufficient condition described in Lemma 1. 
We Use Lemma 1 to Prove the Different Results in Proposition 2
(a) This result is obtained using the sufficient condition in the worst-case scenario
where πd = 0.
(b) This condition is sufficient to guarantee that
Sm
πm
r
h(x∗) + r − 1 > 0
and therefore that the sufficient condition (2) above is satisfied.
(c) Under Cournot competition and linear demand, πd = 49πm, Sm = 32πm , and
Sd = 169 πm . We can therefore rewrite the sufficient condition: − ( 32πm −πm)
(πm − 2 49πm) +πm( 169 πm − 32πm). This condition is always satisfied.
Under Bertrand competition, we need to be a bit more precise. Let
a = (h(x
∗) + r )2
h(x∗)(2h(x∗) + 3r ) < 1.
A stricter sufficient condition is
−a[Sm −πm][πm − 2πd ] +πm[Sd − Sm] > 0.
Under Bertrand competition, the duopoly profits are 0, therefore the condition can
be written Sd + aπm − (a + 1)Sm > 0. Using the results Sm = 32πm and Sd = S0 = 2πm ,
we see that this condition can be rewritten 1 − a > 0. Because a < 1, this condition is
satisfied. 
Proof of Proposition 3
To determine the socially optimal mix of T with the other instruments of patent policy,
we need to calculate the social surplus and the conditions characterizing the equilibrium
amount of research x∗ when the length L of the patent is finite and when surplus and
profits depend on the breadth. It is a small modification of the results obtained in
Section II.
The expected social surplus is given by
E[S] = 2h(x
∗)
2h(x∗) + r
[
Sm(α)
r
(
1 − e−r L−h(x∗)T )
− Sd (α)
r
e−r L
(
1 − e−h(x∗)T ) + S0
r
e−r L
]
+ [1 − e−(r+h(x∗))T ] Sd (α) − Sm(α)
r
2h(x∗)2
(2h(x∗) + r )(h(x∗) + r ) − 2x
∗.
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We now need to determine x∗(T , L,α). Sm, Sd ,πm,πd , and πL all depend on the
parameter α. To simplify the notations, we do not explicitly write the dependence on
α in the following equations.
The expected profit of firm 1, given that firm 2 is investing an amount x2, is shown
by the following:
E[π1] = πm
r
[
1 − e−h(x2)T e−r L] h(x1)
h(x1) + h(x2) + r
− πL
r
[
1 − e−h(x1)T e−r L] h(x2)
h(x1) + h(x2) + r
+ πd −πL
r
[
1 − e−(r+h(x1))T ] h(x1)h(x2)
(h(x1) + r )(h(x1) + h(x2) + r )
+ πd −πm
r
[
1 − e−(r+h(x2))T ] h(x1)h(x2)
(h(x2) + r )(h(x1) + h(x2) + r )
− πd
r
e−r L
(
1 − eh(x1)T ) h(x2)
h(x1) + h(x2) + r
− πd
r
e−r L
(
1 − eh(x2)T ) h(x1)
h(x1) + h(x2) + r .
Using the notation h∗ = h(x∗), the first-order conditions in equilibrium are therefore
given by
r (2h∗ + r )2
(h∗)′
= πm(h∗ + r )(1 − e−r L e−h∗T ) −πmh∗
(
1 − e−(r+h∗)T )
+ (πd −πL )T e−(r+h∗)T (h
∗)2(2h∗ + r )
h∗ + r
+ (πd −πL )
(
1 − e−(r+h∗)T ) [r h(x)(2h(x) + r )
(h(x) + r )2 −
h(x)2
h(x) + r
]
+πd T e−r L e−h∗T h∗(2h∗ + r ) −πde−r L (1 − e−h∗T )
+πL T e−r L e−h∗T (2h∗ + r )h∗ −πL (1 − e−r L e−h∗T )h∗.
We rewrite this equation as G(x∗) = K .
The socially optimal mix is obtained by solving the following problem, where E(S)
and G(x∗) were determined above:
max
T ,L,α
E[S(T , L,α)] subject to T ≥ 0 and T ≤ L and G(x∗) ≥ K andα≥ 0.
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We first verify that the objective function S(T , L,α) is concave in (T , −L,α):
∂2L
∂L2
= r2h(x
∗)
2h(x∗) + r
[
S0e
−r L − Sme−r L−h(x∗)T − Sde−r L
(
1 − e−h(x∗)T )] > 0,
∂2L
∂T 2
= 2h
2(x∗)
2h(x∗) + r
Sm − Sd
r
[
(r + h(x∗))e−(r+h(x∗))T − re−r L−h(x∗)T ] < 0,
∂2L
∂α2
= 2h(x
∗)
2h(x∗) + r
S′′m(α)
r
×
[(
1 − e−r L−h(x∗)T ) − h(x∗)
h(x∗) + r
(
1 − e − (r + h(x∗)T )] < 0.
We can now write the Lagrangian of this problem:
L= E(S) +λ(K − G(x∗)) +μ( − T ) + ν(T − L) + γ ( −α),
with λ≤ 0,μ ≤ 0, ν≤ 0, and γ ≤ 0.
We want to examine under what conditions T ∗ = 0 cannot be a solution. A set of
necessary conditions for T ∗ = 0 to be an equilibrium is as follows:
∂L
∂T
(T ∗ = 0) ≤ 0,
∂L
∂L
(T ∗ = 0) ≤ 0,
∂L
∂α
(T ∗ = 0) ≤ 0.
Therefore a set of sufficient conditions such that T ∗ = 0 cannot be a solution is the
following:
(a)
∂L
∂T
(T ∗ = 0) > 0,
(b)
∂L
∂L
(T ∗ = 0) ≤ 0,
(c)
∂L
∂α
(T ∗ = 0) ≤ 0.
We first derive condition (a) using the fact that ν= 0 by complementary slackness:
∂L
∂T
(T = 0) = 2(h
∗)2
2h∗ + r (1 − e
−r L )
(
Sd − Sm
r
)
−λ[− (πm +πL )(h∗ + r )h∗(1 − e−r L )
+ 2πd (h∗ + r )h∗(1 − e−r L )] −μ ≥ 0.
Furthermore, μ ≤ 0, so we can re-express condition (a) as follows:
∂L
∂T
(T = 0) = 2(h
∗)2
2h∗ + r
(
Sd − Sm
r
)
−λ[− (πm +πL )(h∗ + r )h∗ + 2πd (h∗ + r )h∗] > 0. (A3)
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We then derive condition (b) as:
∂L
∂L
(T ∗ = 0, L∗) = 2h
∗
2h∗ + r e
−r L
(
Sm − S0
r
)
−λ[πm(h∗ + r )re−r L +πL h∗re−r L ] ≤ 0.
Finally, condition (c) is given by
∂L
∂α
(T = 0) = S
′
m(α)
r
2(h∗)
2h∗ + r (1 − e
−r L )
−λ[π ′m(α)(h∗ + r )(1 − e−r L ) −π ′L (α)h∗(1 − e−r L )] ≤ 0.
We can re-express condition (b) as
−λ[πm(h∗ + r )r +πL h∗r ] ≤ 2h
∗
2h∗ + r
(
S0 − Sm
r
)
.
Therefore a sufficient condition for (b) is
−λ≤ 2h
∗
2h∗ + r
(
S0 − Sm
r
)
1
(πm +πL )(h∗ + r )r .
Using this result in equation (A3), we obtain the following sufficient condition:
2(h∗)2
2h∗ + r
(
Sd − Sm
r
)
+ 2h
∗
2h∗ + r
(
S0 − Sm
r
)−(πm +πL )(h∗ + r )h∗ + 2πd (h∗ + r )h∗
(πm +πL )(h∗ + r )r > 0.
This can be re-expressed as the first condition in Proposition 3:
Sd − Sm
0.5(πm +πL ) −πd >
S0 − Sm
0.5(πm +πL ) .
We do the same type of derivation for the other condition. Condition (c) can be re-
expressed:
−λ≤ − 2h
∗
2h∗ + r
(
S′m(α)
r
)
1
(π ′m(α) −π ′∗L + r )r
.
Using this result in equation (A3) above, we obtain the second condition specified in
Proposition 3:
Sd − Sm
πm +πL − 2πd > −
S′m(α)
π ′m(α) −π ′L (α)
. 
Proof of Corollary 1
(a) As we saw in the proof of Proposition 2, with linear demand and Cournot com-
petition, πd = 49πm, Sm = 32πm , and Sd = 169 πm . Furthermore, we define k such that
0.5(πm +πL ) = kπm . We of course have k < 1.
Given these values, condition (1) is equivalent to ( 169 − 32 )k ≥(2 − 32 )(k − 49 ), which
is equivalent to k < 1. The condition is therefore satisfied.
C© The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2010.
438 E. Henry
For result (b) we consider Bertrand competition. Under Bertrand competition,
Sd = S0 and πd = 0, so the two instruments are equivalent. We examine what hap-
pens for a small departure from perfect Cournot competition. We suppose there is, for
example, a small rigidity in prices δ.
We use Taylor expansions of the surplus and profits:
Sd (δ) = Sd (0) + S′d (0)δ+ ◦ (δ).
Because surplus is maximal at Bertrand prices, S′d (0) = 0. We do a similar expansion
for profits, using the fact πd = 0 to rewrite the condition as follows:
S0 + ◦ (δ) − Sm
S0 − Sm ≥
πm +πL − 2π ′d (0)δ− 2 ◦ (δ)
πm +πL .
Because π ′d (0) > 0, irrespective of the nature of the imperfection, the condition will be
satisfied at the limit. 
Proof of Corollary 2
We assume that firm 1 innovates first. Thus θ1 = θ + θ̂ and θ2 = θ + α̂θ. After firms
invent, prices are given by p1 = t + 13 (1 −α)̂θ and p2 = t − 13 (1 −α)̂θ. The consumer
who is indifferent between the two products is situated at x = 12 + 16 t(1 −α)̂θ.
We can now calculate the different profit and welfare functions:
πm = (t + 13 (1 −α)̂θ)x,πL = (t + 13 (1 −α)̂θ)(1 − x), and πd = t/2. Furthermore,
Sm = θ1x + θ2(1 − x) − 12 t x2 − 12 t(1 − x)2 and Sd = θ + θ̂ − 14 t . We also need to
calculate the derivatives:
π ′m(α) = −
2
3
θ̂
[
1
2
+ 1
6t
(1 −α)̂θ
]
, π ′L (α) =
1
9
t(1 −α)̂θ2,
and
S′m(α) = −
5
18t
(1 −α)̂θ2 + θ̂
2
.
Condition (2) can then be re-expressed:
3
[
1
2
− 5
36t
(1 −α)̂θ
]
> 3
1
2 − (5/18t)(1 −α)̂θ
1 + (5/9t)(1 −α)̂θ .
This condition is satisfied for all values of the parameters. 
Proof of Corollary 3
In this situation, πm = 19 [(2 −α)d]2,πL = 19 [(2α− 1)d]2, and πd = 19 d2. In terms of
welfare,
Sm = 4
9
[
1 +α
2
d
]2
+ (1 −α)
2d2
2
and Sd = 4
9
d2.
We also need to calculate the derivatives: π ′m(α) = − d 29 [(2 −α)d],π ′L (α) =
d 49 [(2α− 1)d], and S′m(α) = d 19 [ − 7d + 11αd].
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Condition (2) can then be re-expressed:
5
2 −α− 32α2
3 − 8α+ 5α2 >
−7 + 11α
6α
.
This condition will always be satisfied. 
Proof of Proposition 4
At the date of invention, the expected profits of an inventor choosing menu (T , L) and
facing a competitor of type λ is expressed as follows:
E[π ] =
∫ L
0
e−r tπmdt
∫ + ∞
T
λe−λt2 dt2
+
∫ T
0
[ ∫ t2
0
e−r tπmdt +
∫ L
t2
e−r tπddt
]
λe−λt2 dt2.
Simplifying and factorizing, we find:
E[π ] = πm
r
e−λT [1 − e−r L ] +
[
πm
r
− πd
r
e−r L
]
[1 − e−λT ]
+ λ
λ+ r
[
πd
r
− πm
r
] [
1 − e−(λ+ r )T ] .
We find that
∂π
∂T∂λ
=
[
πm
r
− πd
r
]
[e−λT − r L − e−(λ+ r )T ][1 −λT ].
So if λT < 1, (∂π/∂T∂λ) < 0. Furthermore,
∂π
∂L∂λ
=
[
πd
r
− πm
r
]
e−λT e−r Lr < 0.
So under certain conditions (λT < 1), single crossing properties are satisfied, and
menus (T , L) can be used to sort between more or less efficient inventors. 
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